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ABSTRACT This article discusses the concept of epistemic authority in the context of English law relating to 
expert testimony. It distinguishes between two conceptions of epistemic authority (and epistemic deference), one 
strong and one weak, and argues that only the weak conception is appropriate in a legal context, or in any other 
setting where reliance on experts can be publicly justified. It critically examines Linda Zagzebski’s defence of a 
stronger conception of epistemic authority and questions whether epistemic authority is as closely analogous to 
practical authority as she maintains. Zagzebski elucidates a kind of deference that courts generally, and rightly, try 
to avoid. Her concept of ‘first person reasons’, however, does capture an important aspect of the deliberations of 
conscientious legal actors. 
Introduction 
This article considers what light the concept of epistemic (or theoretical) authority can shed on 
the law regarding expert testimony – and conversely, what light legal approaches to expert 
evidence can shed on more general problems about expert testimony and epistemic authority. I 
shall distinguish between two conceptions of epistemic authority (and epistemic deference), one 
strong and one weak. Only the weak conception, I shall argue, is appropriate in a legal context, 
and much of the law in this area can be understood as an attempt to prevent experts being 
accorded an unwarranted degree of authority. 
In accordance with legal usage, I take an ‘expert’ to be someone who is recognised as 
having a special competence to draw inferences from evidence within a certain domain.1 That 
competence typically derives from access to a large body of evidence and from socialization into 
specialised ways of perceiving and reasoning about evidence of that kind.2 Experts are treated as 
authorities when their drawing certain inferences is treated as a reason for others to draw the 
same inferences, rather than basing their inferences on an independent examination of the 
underlying evidence. In this respect, the authority of experts has a similar structure to that of 
practical authority as analysed by Raz: the expert’s opinion sums up and takes the place of the 
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evidence on which it is based.3 Raz himself has discussed this analogy several times as a way of 
shedding light on the nature of practical authority,4 but the use of the analogy to explain the 
nature of epistemic authority has been most thoroughly explored by Linda Zagzebski.5 Although 
Zagzebski says nothing about the role of experts in legal proceedings and focusses chiefly on 
authority in religious and moral matters, her account of epistemic authority provides an 
interesting foil when developing an account of the role of expert witnesses. To accord experts 
the kind of authority defended by Zagzebski would, I shall argue, be inappropriate in legal 
proceedings or in any other setting where the authority of experts has to be publicly justified. 
These public contexts can be contrasted with the personal religious and moral reflection which is 
Zagzebski’s central concern. The kind of ‘deliberative, or first-person reasons’,6 based on 
sentiments of trust rather than on evidence, on which Zagzebski bases her argument for 
epistemic authority, may nevertheless have to part to play in determining whether a legal 
decision-maker is satisfied to the requisite standard of proof. 
 
Two Conceptions of Epistemic Authority 
When I treat an expert (X) as an authority, I treat the expert’s inferences based upon a certain 
body of evidence (e) as reasons for belief which replace any inference that I might otherwise have 
drawn from e. There are two ways in which X’s asserting p on the basis of e might function as a 
reason in my deliberations. I might treat it as a piece of evidence that counts in favour of p to a 
degree which depends on the strength of my evidence that anything X infers from e is likely to 
be true. In this case I accord X weak epistemic authority (or accord weak deference toX’s  
authority). Or I might regard X’s inferences as replacing my own deliberations, and simply believe 
p to the same degree that X professes to believe it. In that case I accord X strong authority 
It is possible to treat expert evidence in a way that combines elements of strong and 
weak authority. Forensic scientists, in particular, often express their conclusion as lending a 
certain degree of support to some hypothesis. For example, a footwear expert may say that she 
has considered the likelihood that a mark found at the crime scene would have certain features if 
it was made (a) by the defendant’s shoe and (b) by some other shoe, and her findings lend 
‘strong support’ to (a).7 Such conclusions implicitly invite the jury to treat them as strongly 
authoritative in relation to the question of which shoe made the mark – to believe that it lends 
the degree of support to the hypothesis that the expert says it does – while still weighing that 
evidence against other evidence relevant to the issue in the case (e.g. whether the defendant was 
present at the scene). I discuss the legal implications of this point below.  
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Probably the best known general arguments in favour of according a strong form of 
authority to experts are those of John Hardwig. He portrays rational deference to epistemic 
authority as consisting ‘in passively and uncritically accepting what we are given to believe’.8 If 
we have reason to believe that A has good reason to believe p (because A has made inquiries 
which are likely to have furnished A with reliable evidence), we have reason to believe p but we 
do not, Hardwig claims, ourselves have evidence that p. There is one sense of the word ‘evidence’ 
in which is true that A’s belief does not constitute evidence that p. As Fricker remarks, if I am 
asked what is the evidence that smoking causes lung cancer, it does not seem satisfactory to reply 
that many experts say so.9 On the other hand, if I am asked what is my evidence that smoking 
causes cancer, it seems acceptable to say that I have evidence in the form of second- or third-
hand testimony that epidemiologists who have conducted extensive research on the question are 
generally agreed that the evidence that it does so is overwhelming.  
If we accept evidentialism, i.e. that our beliefs should be apportioned to our evidence, it 
would seem that our degree of belief should reflect the strength of our evidence in the latter 
sense.  To apportion our degree of deference to our evidence requires an active and critical 
examination of the reasons that putative authorities can give to persuade us to believe them – 
reasons such as those analysed by Goldman in his response to Hardwig,10 including the experts’ 
track record, agreement from other experts, and their ability to respond to contrary arguments.  
Hardwig’s acceptance of the ‘passive and uncritical’ position of strong deference appears to rest 
on two reasons. 
The first reason is the inescapability of epistemic dependence. Although I can check on 
the expertise of particular experts, Hardwig points out that I generally have to rely on other 
experts to do so.11 At some point, then, I simply have to believe what the experts tell me. 
Reliance on experts to evaluate other experts is certainly a major epistemic problem, not least in 
legal contexts; but far from being a reason for ‘blind trust’ in experts, it seems to be a reason for 
scepticism about them, and for scepticism about one’s own ability to judge the likely truth of 
their assertions. Particularly in the fields of forensic science and psychology, experts may certify 
one another’s expertise and display an apparent consensus despite the fact that key assumptions 
of their disciplines have never been subjected to rigorous inquiry.12 It may be very difficult for 
laypeople or courts to find this out. That is a good reason to distrust forensic science and 
psychology, or at least not to trust them ‘blindly’ as, unfortunately, courts sometimes do. In 
other words it is an argument for adopting only a weak conception of epistemic authority. 
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Hardwig’s second argument is that without relations of epistemic dependence based on 
trust, the division of epistemic labour required by complex forms of knowledge could not 
function. He gives examples from mathematics and physics of inquiries that are so complex that 
no one individual knows all the reasons for believing the conclusion.13 If even experts have to 
trust one another in order to know anything, it might appear that a fortiori laypeople have to trust 
experts in order to know anything about a range of subjects.  
Hardwig’s examples show the extent to which scientific and even mathematical 
knowledge depend upon testimony, and those testimony-based beliefs cannot always be 
grounded in non-testimonial evidence.14 However, the fact that the reasons for believing expert 
or non-expert testimony often depend upon a network of other testimony-based beliefs does not 
prevent our subjecting any particular piece of testimony to careful critical scrutiny of its 
coherence with our other beliefs, testimonial or otherwise.15 Coherence of pieces of testimony 
with one another and with the background beliefs of judges and jurors is the normal way in 
which forensic proof is accomplished.  
 
Zagzebski on Epistemic Authority 
A third argument in favour of a strong form of epistemic authority – or so it appears – is 
Zagzebski’s adaptation of Raz’s analysis of practical authority. On closer examination, however, 
Zagzebski’s analysis, which is focussed on very different kinds of testimony from that heard in a 
courtroom, supports the view that strong deference to authority is inappropriate in situations 
where the beliefs adopted from the expert have to be publicly justified.16 Transposed to a legal 
context, Zagzebski’s argument can be seen as a plausible reconstruction of the inappropriate 
reasons which might lead judges or jurors to accord greater deference to authority than is proper.  
Zagzebski’s argument depends on her view that beliefs can rationally be based not only 
on theoretical or ‘third-person’ reasons, that is, on evidence that can be publicly shared, but also 
on ‘deliberative’ or ‘first-person’ reasons. These are reasons that are personal to me as a would-
be knower, and they include my reasons to trust my own senses and powers of reasoning, to 
trust others who appear to have the same faculties and to be as conscientious as I am, and to 
trust my intuitions and emotions, including admiration for those I take to be wiser than I am. On 
this basis, Zagzebski argues that I may arrive at a ‘conscientious judgment’ that I am most likely 
to acquire true beliefs and avoid false beliefs in certain matters by believing what some other 
person believes, rather than trying ‘to figure out what to believe myself.’17 Such a person is, for 
me, an epistemic authority. 
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Zagzebski’s theory of epistemic authority is closely modelled on Raz’s account of 
practical authority. An epistemic authority is someone whose beliefs in a certain domain I trust 
to such a degree that ‘the conscientious thing to do is to let the other person stand in for me in 
my attempt to judge the truth in that domain and to adopt his belief.’18 Just like Razian practical 
authority, Zagzebski argues, epistemic authority is both content-independent and preemptive. It 
is content-independent in the sense that, if it is a good reason to believe p that the authority 
believes p, it would equally be a good reason to believe q that the authority believes q.19 And it is 
preemptive in the sense that ‘The fact that the authority has a belief p is a reason for me to 
believe p that replaces my other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to 
them.’20 
Zagzebski’s idea that the epistemic authority ‘stands in for’ the epistemic subject and the 
authority’s beliefs take the place of the subject’s other reasons for belief  captures rather well the 
kind of deference to experts that judges generally deplore (although they are not altogether 
consistent in this respect). It is axiomatic, at least in Anglo-American law, that judges and juries 
are responsible for reaching verdicts on the basis of their own understanding of the evidence 
presented to them. This task is not to be delegated to experts.21 Implicitly, the law is committed 
to an internalist epistemology: decisions about what the courts are to take to be true must not 
only be reliable (or at least avoid one type of error, wrongful conviction) but must be justified 
from the perspective of those who make them.22 
In this respect the law’s implicit epistemology resembles what Zagzebski calls ‘standard 
epistemic egoism’: the view that a justified belief is one that is ultimately based on reasons that 
the believer ‘has acquired by the direct use of his own faculties,’ including the testimony of 
others where he has good reasons, based ultimately on his own perception, memory and reason, 
to believe those others to be reliable.23 Whether or not ‘standard egoism’ is a sound view in 
epistemology generally, it reflects the responsibility of judges and juries to base their verdicts 
solely on their own understanding of the evidence before them. Zagzebski argues that standard 
epistemic egoists should adopt a modified version of her adaptation of Raz’s normal justification 
thesis, which she calls ‘Justification Thesis 1 for the Authority of Belief (JAB 1)’. In its modified 
version for ‘egoists’ (or as I would prefer to say, evidentialists), JAB 1 reads as follows: 
The authority of another person’s belief is justified by my evidence that I am more likely 
to form a true belief and avoid a false belief if I believe what the authority believes rather 
than try to figure out what to believe myself.24 
Let us call this JAB 1*. 
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Given the strong sense in which Zagzebski uses the word ‘authority’, I submit that JAB 
1* is plainly false. If another person’s belief has authority for me in Zagzebski’s sense, I am 
justified in simply adopting that belief as my own.  But the type of evidence mentioned in JAB 1* 
can justify no more than the following claim: if the other person believes p and, were I to form 
an unaided judgment, I would believe q, p is more likely to be true than q. The mere fact that p is 
more likely to be true than my uneducated guess q cannot be a sufficient reason to believe p. The 
other’s person’s belief is evidence for p, but it may fall far short of being sufficient evidence to 
justify my believing p.  
JAB1* comes close to one of the most dangerous judicial fallacies about expert evidence: 
the one committed by the trial judge, and seemingly condoned by the Court of Appeal, in R v 
Dallagher25 – a case which is a prime example of the courts’ lack of consistency in rejecting strong 
claims to epistemic authority. A witness who professed to be an expert in the novel ‘science’ of 
‘ear-printing’ told the jury that he was ‘absolutely convinced’ that certain deposits on a murder 
victim’s window were an impression made by the defendant’s ear. The judge told the jury that ‘If 
you are sure that [the expert’s] evidence is correct and you accept it then you would be entitled to 
convict on his evidence alone,’ though they accepted another forensic scientist’s slightly more 
cautious conclusion. Although the Court of Appeal ordered a retrial (at which the charges were 
dropped after it was found that DNA in the deposit on the window was not Dallagher’s) it 
approved the terms in which the evidence had been given and made no criticism of the judge’s 
summing up.26 In the (then) primitive state of ear-printing ‘science’ it is impossible to discern any 
evidential basis on which the jury could have been sure that the expert’s confidence was justified. 
A jury that accepted JAB1*, however, would seemingly be entitled just to adopt the expert’s 
belief as its own –  though it might be possible to escape this conclusion by arguing that a 
purported scientist who expresses an ‘absolute conviction’ without his methods being properly 
tested is not a conscientious epistemic subject and this disqualifies him as an authority. 
Zagzebski never considers the possibility that a rational    response to some piece of 
putatively authoritative testimony might be to believe it only to a certain degree, or to believe it 
have a certain probability of being true. The fact that ‘belief, unlike action, comes in degrees’27 
marks an important distinction between practical and theoretical authority which Zagzebski 
ignores when she adopts Raz’s argument that, so long as an authority has a better chance of 
being right than I do, I shall do the right thing more often if I consistently follow the authority’s 
directives than if I weigh those directives against my own reasons for acting otherwise.28 In the 
case of a theoretical authority, however, the result of such a balancing exercise might be, not that 
I mistakenly disbelieve p when the authority asserts p, but that I correctly judge that the 
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subjective probability of p given my evidence (including the fact that the authority asserts p) is 
less than the probability asserted by the authority on the basis of her evidence. In a situation such 
as that of a juror in a criminal trial, where it is unjustifiable to believe p (and infer from p that the 
defendant is guilty) unless p is overwhelmingly probable, the result may be the correct one, given 
that the verdict has to be based on the evidence available to the jury, not that available to the 
expert.  
The fact that Zagzebski does not consider this point may be connected to her view that 
first-person reasons are different in kind from third-personal evidence and that these two kinds 
of reasons for belief cannot be ‘aggregated’ to reach judgments of probability.29 In judging that 
someone is an authority in relation to us, it seems that we must rely partly on third-person 
reasons, for example, evidence that the putative authority has greater access to relevant evidence 
than we do, and partly on first-person reasons such as trust in the putative authority and 
admiration for her epistemic virtues. It is not clear whether Zagzebski takes the non-aggregative 
character of the two kinds of reasons to entail that we cannot use them in combination as a basis 
for estimates of probability at all, so that we are confined to a binary judgment either to believe 
or to withhold belief, or merely that in basing judgements of probability on both kinds of 
reasons we cannot rely on Bayes’ theorem or any other mathematical formula. The latter view is 
more plausible, and is consistent with Zagzebski’s repeated references to the authority being 
‘more likely’ than the deferring party to be right about some matter. But in that case we are left 
with no explanation of why authority-based beliefs do not come in degrees. 
Zabzebski does consider whether, given that an authority is fallible, we should believe 
the authority’s pronouncement or withhold belief. She maintains that ‘if the authority is in a 
better position to get the truth than I, the authority is presumably also in a better position to 
judge whether she should believe or withhold belief’.30 That may be so, but on Zagzebski’s 
account this is a first-person judgment by the authority about what she (the authority) should 
believe. What gives me a first-person reason to adopt the authority’s belief, according to 
Zagzebski, is that the authority’s belief is ‘formed in a way that I would conscientiously believe is 
deserving of emulation’.31 For that to be a sufficient reason for me to adopt the authority’s view 
in every case where she judges that she should believe rather than withhold belief, my conviction 
that she deserves emulation must be so firm that it gives me a reason for belief as strong as the 
authority’s own reasons, notwithstanding that those reasons are inaccessible to me. Such 
reasoning might be plausible if I regard the authority with degree of reverence akin to that of a 
disciple for a guru. It can have no application to putative epistemic authorities in everyday life, let 
alone in the courtroom.  
8 
 
I cannot discuss here whether or not Zagzebski’s first-person reasons form an adequate 
basis for the kind of deference to authority that she advocates in moral and religious matters, 
which are her central concerns.32  Rather, I want to contrast this model of authority with the type 
of epistemic authority that is appropriate in legal settings or in assessing expert testimony in 
general. I suspect that Zagzebski would agree that her model has at best a limited application in 
these contexts. 
Although Zagzebski follows Richard Moran33 in arguing that we do not normally treat 
testimony – in the sense of people telling us things – as evidence, but rather believe it because we 
accept the testifier’s assurance, she acknowledges that it is possible to treat testimony as 
evidence. In particular, it may be preferable to rely on third-person, evidential reasons for belief 
when communicating with other people, since good third-person reasons are reasons that 
everyone can accept.34 Since legal verdicts have to be publicly justified, they must be justified by 
third-person reasons, even if they are partly motivated by first-person reasons. In an English 
criminal trial the motivation of the jury’s verdict will usually never be known, and may involve 
jurors ‘trusting their instincts’, but the verdict must be publicly justified by the judge’s summing-
up, which presents the reasons which could, if accepted by the jury, justify a conviction or an 
acquittal.   
There is also a general reason why Zagzebski’s model does not apply to experts. The 
most important of the ‘first person reasons’ we have to trust others, according to her, is that we 
take them to have the same epistemic characteristics as we trust in ourselves. If a speaker claims 
to be an expert in relation to me, she claims to have some epistemic characteristic that I do not 
have myself, namely expertise in a particular area. The epistemic characteristic that someone has 
if they are an expert relative to me is an acquired skill in making judgments in a particular 
domain, which typically involves more than just knowing a large number of propositions.35 That 
somebody has such a skill, and that its deliverances are reliable (unlike those of, for example, an 
astrologer who is highly skilled in perceiving the nuances of a horoscope) is something that can 
only be established by evidence. It is true that such evidence – for example that a fingerprint 
expert has undergone extensive training and in tests has correctly discriminated between prints 
which do and do not share a common source in 99% of cases – may come in the form of 
testimony from the expert herself. We may accept that evidence at least partly because we trust 
the expert’s assurance that it is true (although in a legal setting we might also infer 
trustworthiness from the facts that the witness is on oath, is bound to disclose certain matters by 
procedural rules, and might face severe costs if any lies or omissions were exposed by the 
opposing lawyers).36 In accepting the witness’s assurance on these matters of fact, or in 
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presuming her to be competent and sincere in recalling such matters, we accord her no more 
deference than we do to ordinary testimony in everyday life. Courts do, in fact, accept expert 
witnesses’ testimony as to their qualifications without routinely demanding any further proof. 
That still leaves open the question of what we as non-experts can safely infer from such evidence 
as to the reliability of the witness’s expert judgments. 
There will be some cases in which we have such strong evidence that a testifier (expert or 
otherwise) is reliable that we are justified in believing their testimony as fully, or almost as fully, 
as we would be by Zagzebski’s first person reasons. Fricker spells this out in her ‘Testimony 
Deferential Acceptance Principle’: 
One properly accepts that P on the basis of trust in another’s testimony that P – her 
word that P – just if she speaks sincerely, and she is well enough placed with respect to P 
that were she to have, or make a judgement to form, a conscious belief regarding 
whether P, her belief would almost certainly be knowledge; and she is better epistemically 
placed with respect to P than oneself; and one recognizes these things to be so; and one 
is not aware of significant contrary testimony regarding P.37 
This principle is very significantly more stringent than Zagzebski’s ‘Justification Thesis 1 
for the Authority of Testimony’, which she interprets Fricker as broadly endorsing,38 and seems 
easier to satisfy with respect to ordinary eyewitnesses who were simply in the right place at the 
right time than it is with respect to experts, because even if some experts are as epistemically 
well-placed as the principle demands, it is hard for laypeople to recognise whether they are.  
Fricker does accept that expertise can warrant ‘strong deference’ in her sense of that phrase, 
namely that although I have reasons to believe the contrary of what the expert asserts, I should 
let the expert’s judgment overrule my own.39 But justified deference for Fricker always depends 
on my possessing adequate evidence concerning the expert’s epistemic situation, competence 
and sincerity. In that sense she is an advocate of the ‘weak’ form of deference that I argue is 
appropriate in the courtroom. 
How wide the gulf between strong and weak deference to authority can be is strikingly 
illustrated by the only passage in Zagzebski’s book where she assigns a hypothetical degree of 
probability to the authority’s being right (a ratio suggested by an analogy with baseball): 
In many epistemic domains we can hope to get a better truth/falsehood ratio than .333, 
but in other domains that is the best the authority can do and I will do much worse than 
that on my own. There is also the option of refraining from believing anything in those 
domains, and sometimes that is the best option, but not always. It depends on which 
alternative will better satisfy my future conscientious self-reflection: nonbelief or belief 
on authority.40 
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Since it does not seem psychologically possible, let alone rational, to believe p while also 
believing that p is twice as likely to be false as to be true,41 a charitable interpretation of what 
Zagzebski means here is that it may be rational to trust an authority even if, for all one knows, 
they may be wrong two-thirds of the time. Be that as it may, this passage yields an important 
insight: believing on the basis of authority is an attractive epistemic strategy in situations where 
we want to believe something – and believe it fully, not merely that it has some degree of 
probability – even at the cost of a high risk of believing something false.42 Zagzebski indeed 
suggests that people rightly prefer belief to doubt, because a ‘self that doubts is less harmonious 
than one that has beliefs’.43 In a criminal trial, the jury or judge should set that preference aside, 
and refrain from forming any belief in the defendant’s guilt where there is a significant risk that 
such a belief would be false (no positive belief in innocence is needed to return a verdict of ‘Not 
Guilty’). Even in a civil trial, the judge should refrain from believing any proposition that a party 
is required to prove unless satisfied that the evidence shows it to be more probable than not. 
 If we accept Zagzebski’s analysis as a plausible attempt to make explicit the ways in 
which people, as she puts it, resolve dissonances between their beliefs, or between their beliefs 
and their  desires,44 we can see how a juror, for example, might well come to accord strong 
authority to an expert opinion. Particularly in cases of serious crime it is, presumably, a painful 
predicament to have a high degree of belief in a defendant’s guilt without being able to say that 
one is sure of guilt. If simply adopting an expert’s belief could make the juror sure of guilt (or 
innocence) it might be tempting to do so, especially if they take something like McMyler’s view 
that their epistemic responsibility for their belief, and moral responsibility for any resulting 
action, is shared between epistemic authorities and those who believe them.45 The point is well 
expressed in a psychological analysis of Dutch criminal trials (where the factfinders are 
professional judges rather than jurors): 
The terrible dilemma…is obvious. Acquitting an actual child abuser, just because there is 
little evidence, is not what we want. He or she may do it again and make new victims, but 
in cases like these, real proof is hard to come by….[When] the trustworthiness of the 
victim bec[omes] the key issue…a confidently speaking expert would not only resolve 
the court’s dilemma, but also relieve the court of some of its responsibility. 
Unfortunately things are not so easy…..46  
 
Weak Epistemic Authority in the Courts 
Having paid Zagzebski the backhanded compliment that her theory is a useful model of the kind 
of authority that should not be allowed determine the outcome of legal proceedings, I now wish 
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to contrast it with the kind of epistemic authority which is acceptable in the courts, and which 
does not share key characteristics of Razian practical authority.  
One of the most explicit statements of the orthodox common-law view of epistemic 
dependence on experts is found in a case much cited in English as well as Scottish case law, 
Davie v. Edinburgh Corporation.47 It is worth explaining the facts of the case. Mr Davie was one of 
several home-owners who claimed that their property had been damaged by blasting carried out 
in the course of constructing a sewer. The defendants relied on the evidence of an engineer who, 
applying a formula from a piece of published research, maintained that the property was too far 
from the blasting to be damaged by it. The judge, however, accepted that the coincidence in 
timing between the blasting and the appearance of cracks in the allegedly affected buildings 
proved that the blasting probably was responsible. The defendants appealed, arguing that the 
judge was not entitled to reject uncontradicted expert evidence. In effect, they maintained that 
the judge should simply have adopted the expert’s opinion and treated it as an exclusionary 
reason which pre-empted any consideration of other evidence such as the times at which cracks 
appeared. In emphatically rejecting this argument, Lord Cooper remarked: 
Expert witnesses however skilled or eminent, can give no more than evidence. … Their 
duty is to furnish the Judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the 
accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the Judge or jury to form their own 
independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence. 
The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested, becomes a factor 
(and often an important factor) for consideration along with the whole other evidence in 
the case, but the decision is for the Judge or jury. In particular the bare ipse dixit of a 
scientist… will normally carry little weight, for … the parties have invoked the decision 
of a judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement by an expert.48 
One of the striking things about this classic dictum is that it fully acknowledges the court’s 
epistemic dependence on the expert. It is the expert himself who must provide the criteria by 
which his own expertise is to be judged. What this meant in the factual context of the case was 
that the expert had to provide the judge with the scientific grounds for believing that the formula 
he applied could be relied upon to determine the possibility of damage from the cumulative 
effect of repeated blasting on a building constructed as Mr Davie’s bungalow was. Apparently 
only one relevant experiment had been conducted, and the judge thought the building involved 
was probably more robustly built than Mr Davie’s bungalow. From this, in Lord Cooper’s view, 
the trial judge had been fully entitled to conclude that the scientific evidence did not rule out the 
effect to which the other evidence pointed.49  
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We can clearly see in this case that the expert evidence is not treated as pre-emptive. It 
does not afford an exclusionary reason why the judge should not examine the reasons on which 
it rests. On the contrary, he must examine them to determine whether they are ‘intelligible’, have 
withstood testing in court, and are ‘convincing’. Nor does the expert’s authority exclude other 
reasons known to the judge, such as the temporal proximity of the damage to the blasting. 
Nevertheless, the expert’s reasoning is at least in some respects authoritative. For example, the 
judge could not have worked out for himself the formula by which the ‘amplitude’ of earth 
movement could be calculated from the weight of explosives, readings from a vibrograph, and 
distance from the site.50 But the expert’s authority was not a reason for the judge to refrain from 
working this out for himself. On the contrary, his inability to work it out for himself was what 
justified his reliance on the expert’s authority.   
There is one respect in which it does appear right to treat expert evidence as an 
exclusionary reason, and that is to avoid double-counting. Double-counting occurs when a fact 
which is known to the expert and the court both forms part of the expert’s reasons and is treated 
by the court as an independent reason for coming to the same conclusion. For example in R v 
Weighman,51 a forensic scientist compared a CCTV image with that of the defendant and said that 
the similarities gave ‘strong support’ for an identification. The Court of Appeal found that this 
evidence ‘taken together with the fact that the jury were able to look at these images themselves’ 
was sufficient to justify conviction.52 While seeing the images for themselves may have helped 
the jury to understand the scientist’s evidence, it was not an additional factor that could be added to 
the scientist’s evidence based on the same facial features.  In a more recent case the Court of 
Appeal accepted that it could not have made a difference to the strength of the evidence in 
Weighman.53 
The courts’ reluctance to accord strong authority to experts can be seen in two 
controversial areas of the law on expert evidence. 
The first area is the limited admissibility of expert evidence about a credibility of a 
witness. Although the exclusion of evidence about the reliability of particular witnesses could be 
justified by the unreliability of the expert evidence itself, the leading cases on the subject suggest 
that what mainly troubles the judges is that they want jurors to base their verdicts on their own 
view of the credibility of the witnesses.54 In other words, they fear that the jury’s reliance on the 
expert’s authority may pre-empt their own assessment of the witness, resulting in an improper 
delegation of decision-making power to the expert. As Chief Justice McLachlin put it in the 
Canadian Supreme Court, ‘Faced with an expert’s impressive credentials and mastery of scientific 
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jargon, jurors are more likely to abdicate their role as fact-finders and simply attorn to the 
opinion of the expert in their desire to reach a just result’.55 McLachlin, however, dissented from 
the Supreme Court’s majority view that for this reason an expert should not to be allowed to 
testify about the reasons why a child might delay reporting sexual abuse. This was evidence that 
the jury could properly have taken into account without its pre-empting their own judgment as 
to the credibility of the child complainant. My own view is that McLachlin was right: the jury 
needed this information to avoid the risk of ‘epistemic injustice’ to the child who might be 
disbelieved because of a lack of understanding of sexual abuse.56 As McLachlin acknowledged, 
there is a difficult balancing act in such cases between the ‘probative value’ of the evidence and 
the ‘prejudicial effect’ constituted by the risk that the jury may ‘attorn’ to it and treat it as a 
strongly authoritative finding that the complainant is truthful. 
A second example of the courts’ concern to keep experts from asserting a strong form of 
epistemic authority can be seen in the controversial case of R v T (Footwear Mark Evidence).57 The 
case concerned the practice, discussed above, of using a form of words to express the degree of 
support that a piece of evidence, in this case a shoeprint, gave to the hypothesis that the 
defendant (or someone wearing his shoes) and been at the scene of the crime. The expert’s 
choice of words reflected his estimate of the likelihood ratio, based on comparing the shoe with 
data about shoes worn by other criminal suspects.  The Court of Appeal was rightly critical of 
the expert’s failure to explain his reasoning to the jury, but to the dismay of many statisticians 
and forensic scientists they went further and said that such calculations of the likelihood ratio 
should not be used at all.58  
The Court’s reasoning seems muddled in places, and its suggestion that the expert should 
have said merely that the shoes ‘could have made’59 the mark at the crime scene is unhelpful. 
Implicitly, however, the Court seems to have recognised that the method used by the expert was 
a way of staking a claim to strong authority while also recognising that his was not the only 
evidence the jury had to consider. In effect, the expert was purporting to make an authoritative 
judgment about the weight to be attached to his own evidence. What this failed to take into 
account was the extent to which the estimate of the likelihood ratio depended on the nature of 
the database used by the expert (in fact, this was considerably more favourable to the defendant 
than the data which the defence, unaware of the database the expert had used, drew upon to 
cross-examine him). The Court’s concern that the ‘verisimilitude of mathematical probability’ 
might lend a jury to accord undue authority to the expert’s own view of the strength of the 
evidence was well founded, however unsatisfactory its remedy may be.60   
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Within common-law scholarship, debate about expert evidence has largely centred on 
how far to strengthen the ‘gatekeeping’ role of judges so as to exclude evidence deemed 
insufficiently reliable to be considered by the jury. This is too complex an issue to address in 
detail here, but it is worth briefly noting the implications of the idea of weak deference for the 
debate. If we believe that non-expert factfinders can make reasonable assessments of the weight 
to be accorded to expert evidence we will not want to set the threshold of admissibility so high 
that excludes evidence to which a reasonable factfinder could assign considerable weight when 
considering it as part of a larger body of evidence. On the other hand, if we are mindful of the 
temptation to accord expert testimony a stronger form of deference than is rationally justifiable, 
we will have reason to shield factfinders from evidence that gratuitously st  
The Law Commission of England and Wales, influenced by but, in my view,61 
significantly improving upon the US Supreme Court’s influential judgment in Daubert v Merrill 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, proposed a statutory test that would meet these desiderata rather well. To be 
admissible, expert evidence would have to be ‘soundly based’ and the ‘strength of the opinion’ 
would have to be ‘warranted having regard to the ground on which it is based’. The test would 
allow evidence with only a modest scientific basis to be admitted provided that any conclusions 
drawn by the expert were expressed in appropriately cautious terms. The Law Commission 
proposed a set of guidelines for judges to assess whether evidence was ‘soundly based’. 
Unfortunately the government declined to introduce the proposed legislation. The guidelines for 
judges have made their way into law through a Practice Direction issued by the Lord Chief 
Justice, but without the statutory test that they were designed to accompany. I have argued 
elsewhere that the gap left by the failure to legislate can be filled by developing the embryonic 
common-law test of whether evidence is ‘sufficiently reliable to be admitted’ in a way that is 
faithful to the Davie principle: evidence is ‘sufficiently reliable’ if it provides the jury with a 
sufficient basis to decide how far they can rely on it. The question of what degree of weight a 
jury could rationally accord the evidence needs to be considered not only in relation to the 
admissibility of the evidence but also in relation to whether the evidence against a defendant, 
taken as a whole, amounts to a case to answer, and in considering how to advise the jury about 
the evaluation of the evidence. 
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A Place for ‘First Person Reasons’? 
I have argued – and I believe Zagzebski would agree – that decisions made in a public forum 
such as a trial have to justified by ‘third person’ reasons, that is, by evidence. That is not to say 
that reaching a verdict in a trial involves nothing but the assessment of probabilities based on 
evidence. Such a simple view would ignore two crucial features of the trial. 
First, it has often been pointed out in the literature on evidence that there is a gap 
between statistical probabilities and verdicts.62  A criminal jury is not asked whether they find the 
probability of guilt reaches some quantitative threshold such as .9 or .99, but rather whether they 
are ‘sure’ of guilt. This requirement to be sure is, as Duff et al. argue, linked to a central function 
of the criminal trial: the public moral censure of those found guilty.63 Such a public expression of 
‘reactive attitudes’, notionally on behalf of the community at large, cannot appropriately be based 
on anything less than a claim to know the accused is guilty.64 Even in civil trials, there is 
controversy over whether ‘nakedly statistical’ evidence of the facts necessary to establish liability 
is sufficient to prove a case ‘on the balance of probabilities’. I argue elsewhere65 that a civil 
verdict is best understood as a decision to accept the facts alleged as true or false for certain 
practical purposes. In situations such as the much discussed hypothetical case where someone is 
run down by an unidentified bus, and one company operates the majority of buses in town, the 
statistical probability of an event does not entail that justice would be done by accepting that it 
has occurred. There is, then, a gap (and not only in legal contexts) between forming a certain 
degree of belief in a proposition and either fully believing it (and being willing to assert it as true, 
as in a criminal verdict) or accepting it for practical purposes (as in a civil verdict).  When judges 
or jurors have to search their consciences to decide ‘Am I sure?’ or ‘Am I satisfied on the 
balance of probabilities?’ what Zagzebski calls first-person reasons may have a part to play.For 
example: ‘I feel sure that the complainant’s evidence was truthful and though I cannot claim to 
have evidence that I am a reliable judge of truthfulness, I believe I can conscientiously trust my 
judgment in this respect’. 
That something other than a probabilistic assessment of evidence is involved in the trial 
is confirmed by the importance that common-law trials attach to oral evidence and argument.66 
The face-to-face encounter between witnesses, judges, jurors and advocates seems calculated to 
elicit affective responses including trust in, and empathy for, particular witnesses. To bring these 
affective responses under Zagzebski’s category of ‘first person reasons’ may be a more 
satisfactory explanation of their importance than the orthodox view that the ‘demeanour of the 
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witness’ is a species of ‘real evidence’.67 The weight attached to such factors is limited, in the 
English criminal trial, by the requirement that there must be ‘a case to answer’: there must be 
evidence which, if accepted, could rationally persuade the jury beyond reasonable doubt. Reasons 
such as a disposition to trust a particular witness come into play within what Raz calls the 
‘latitude in the space of reasons’, where it is rational to believe something (or someone) but not 
irrational to withhold belief.68  Though such reasons are not specifically relevant to experts, and 
may indeed be less relevant to experts than to other witnesses,69 a sentiment of trust in a 
particular expert or disposition to trust some class of experts, or experts in general, might be the 
sort of ‘first person’ reason that could figure in a juror’s or judge’s deliberations.  
 
Conclusion 
When assessing expert evidence, the task of juries and judges is to determine the strength of the 
reasons accessible to them (and to the public at large) for believing what experts assert. We should 
be slow to accept arguments that juries (or scientifically unqualified judges) are incompetent to 
assess expert evidence. The only competence required is ordinary rationality, and citizens in a 
democracy (as well as judges!) should be presumed competent to make rational judgments. 
However, there are reasons to think that juries and judges may be tempted to accord more 
deference to experts than is appropriate in legal contexts, and the law should (and to some extent 
already does) control expert evidence so as make clear the grounds for doubt as well as belief 
and minimise the temptation to accord it undue authority.  
A more general conclusion that can be drawn from the above analysis is that laypeople 
have considerable leeway in rationally believing experts or withholding belief. Judgments are 
likely to depend partly on evidence of the experts’ reliability, partly on trust, and partly on the 
balance between the desirability of forming some definite belief about the matter in question and 
avoiding a false belief. The degree to which laypeople may rationally reject or be sceptical about 
the findings of experts has often been defended by those who adopt a social constructionist view 
of scientific knowledge.70 The arguments advanced here are quite independent of social 
constructionism, but they point in a similar direction. 
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